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We can get an idea of the cognitive science of religion from a recent Reader on 
Religion and Cognition (Slone 2006) in which the first part presents us reviews of 
its meta-theoretical and theoretical frameworks: “The cognitive science of religion, 
while welcoming inter pretive work, seeks to make explanatory contributions to our 
understanding of religion and in the process redress the imbalance”(Slone 2006:2). 
The latter is a consequence of the fact that most scholars in the study of religion do 
exclusively interpretive work. The cognitive approach does not wish to silence the 
interpretivists, but reclaims a role for scientific theorizing in the study of culture. The 
latter is not ‘owned’ solely by cultural anthropology (McCauley & Lawson 1996). So 
what exactly are the explanatory theories of the cognitive science of religion? Most, 
Jason Slone writes, operate within the theoretical framework of ‘cul tural epidemiology’ 
outlined by Dan Sperber. His epidemiological approach shows us a two way street: in 
one way, cognition constrains what kind of mental representations become cultural 
forms, in the other way, religious systems seem to be cultural forms fit for cognitive 
consumption. A third contribution in the Reader tells us what human cognition is 
like such that religion is such a good fit for it. The human mind is domain-specific, 
consisting in different “modules” that per form specific tasks. Importantly, much of 
the information each module pos sesses is non-cultural, but rather part of the cogni-
tive architecture itself. The mind is neither a “blank slate” nor a “black box”; it is a 
domain specific computational, representational, information processor. It is this move 
that allows cognitive scholars to explain that they no longer consider religion a matter 
of irrationality. Religion is to be explained in terms of our normal cognitive makeup. 
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“[R]eligious thought and action turn overwhelmingly on harnessing perfectly ordinary 
forms of cognition available to all normally equipped human beings”(McCauley & 
Whitehouse 2005:1). The fact that minds contain non-cultural information leads to an 
important question: where does this cognitive information come from? Well, religion 
can be said to be “natural”, and human evolution explains were it comes from. The step 
towards evolutionary psychology becomes obvious and many in the field fully agree 
with Tooby and Cosmides when they write that researchers in anthropology, econom-
ics, sociology, and we can include the study of religion, have to realize 
that theories about the evolved architecture of the human mind play a necessary and central 
role in any causal account of human affairs… Cognitive scientists will make far more 
rapid progress in mapping this evolved architecture if they begin to seriously incorporate 
knowledge from evolutionary biology and its related disciplines… into their repertoire of 
theoretical tools, and use theories of adaptive function to guide their empirical investiga-
tions. (Tooby & Cosmides 1998:195)
On this point, Robert McCauley and Harvey Whitehouse even see an important 
contribution by the study of religion. It can enrich the current theorizing about 
cognition that has tended to remain insulated from neural, evolutionary, emotional 
and bodily considerations.(McCauley & Whitehouse 2005:4) For the study of religion 
itself, however, it is like returning to an old dream. As Armin Geertz formulates it: 
Is there anything more intriguing than the evolutionary history of anatomically modern 
humans and the role that religion may have played in that history? In other words, can the 
study of religion continue to claim scientific status without concerning itself with origins? 
I think not. Fortunately for us, the methodology of prehistoric science has improved 
significantly, and we are now in the un precedented position to infer insights about our 
origins. (Geertz 2004:355)
Paying attention to the possible evolutionary foundations of neural and cognitive 
processes allows of course for different perspectives. Some have tried to argue that 
religion and religious cognition arose as a solution to particular adaptive problems in 
hominid evolution. The majority of cognitive scientists of religion, however, see no 
evidence for a cognitive architecture specialized for the acquisition of religious thought 
and behavior. Most see religion as an ‘accidental by-product’ of specialized cognitive 
mechanisms, in other words, as a ‘spandrel’. Some take a third option into considera-
tion: for hominids natural evolution is accompanied by cultural evolution through 
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cultural pathways of descent. In any case, Matthew Day argues, selectionist theorizing 
or ‘natural selection centered’ theorizing is becoming an important trend in the study 
of religion, and with good reason: 
Throughout the twentieth century the evo lutionary framework has demonstrated an 
unparalleled ability to explain the morphology, behavior, and cognition of our arboreal 
neigh bors. This suggests that the conceptual and methodological tools that evolution-
ary theorists use to study other organisms should in principle work on us as well. As a 
consequence, if the academic study of religion is to be a genuinely human science it strikes 
one that it must be Darwinian in the modest sense of being consistent with the theory of 
evolution by means of natural selection. (Day 2005:81)
I agree with Armin Geertz (2004) that the recent developments in the study of 
religion characterized by the application of cognitive and related theories are not 
a passing fashion and that we should take these new cognitive and neo-Darwinian 
trends seriously. As I see it, though the task isn’t small, we should interact critically, 
that is, not simply copy and paste, but delve in and root up, recognizing that funda-
mental discussions are going on even in these fields of research. I further agree with 
scholars like McCauley and Day and with evolutionary psychologists that discussions 
concerning the relationship between cognition and culture should pay attention to the 
broader neo-Darwinian framework. However, rather than considering the Darwinian 
framework simply as established, I want to give space to a view that takes it seriously 
enough to delve in and uproot a few things. To do so, I start from two small letters 
published in Anthropology Today. Ingold’s ‘The Poverty of Selectionism’ elicited a 
quick response from Maurice Bloch. These letters form my entry into the thorough 
work of both authors. A comparison subsequently allows me to bring to the surface 
important points of deviation which should inform further discussions concerning 
nature, cogition, culture and religion. 
The poverty of selectionism and response
In ‘The Poverty of Selectionism’(2000), it’s clear that Tim Ingold’s frustrations 
with neo-Darwinism had come to a boiling point. The different brands of neo-
Darwinism in the human sciences, he writes, see human beings, their mind as well as 
their manifold and ever-changing patterns of behavior, as simply explainable through 
attribution “to designs or programmes that have been assembled from elements of 
intergenerational transmissible information, through a process of natural selection 
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analogous if not identical, to what is supposed to bring about the evolution of organic 
forms” (Ingold 2000:1). In previous work, he has disagreed strongly with this view 
on several points. His main problem is that these ‘selectionists’ are unaware of signifi-
cant developments in social and cultural theory, hence making mistakes which are old 
news for anthropologists, while new developments in that field are simply ignored. 
For Ingold, selectionism is just bad science, full of shoddy thinking and confusing the 
testing of hypotheses with the use of natural selection as a logical device that simply 
turns description into explanation. 
Ingold’s pointed article received immediate response from Maurice Bloch. In a 
letter in the next issue, Bloch agreed with Ingold that much in the work of memeti-
cists, evolutionary psycholo gists, and sociobiologists was stupid and needed a serious 
response from social and cultural anthropologists. His own contribution to Darwinizing 
Culture (2000) can be seen as one such reaction. However, he considers Ingold’s article 
as not up to the task, simply because it applies the category ‘selectionist’ to a group 
of people who hold views that have ‘nothing in common’. (Bloch 2000:25) The main 
mistake Ingold makes according to Bloch is that sociobiologists and memeticists are 
seen as not much different, whereas in fact they differ significantly if only for the point 
that sociobiologists consider much of culture to be directly genetically determined 
whereas memeticists take an opposite view. Illustrative for Ingold’s painting with too 
broad a brush is that Dan Sperber is once again miscategorized as a memeticist, in 
spite of the fact, Bloch points out, that Sperber is criticizing memetics in the same way 
Ingold does, but with more reasoned arguments. From other publications by Bloch, 
it’s clear these reasoned arguments build upon work from a third group that Ingold 
seems to simply lump together with sociobiologists and memeticists: the evolutionary 
psychologists. However, as Bloch frequently argues in his writings elsewhere, their 
views again differ considerably from sociobiological and memeticist perspectives and 
form a rich source for a sophisticated naturalism suitable for anthropological theoriz-
ing. (Bloch & Sperber 2002:732) Ingold’s anger is for Bloch just a silly response to the 
fact that the people he categorizes as “selectionists” sell more books. But this merely 
signals the fact that anthropology has no alternative to offer, since they have abandoned 
the very attempt to answer general questions about human beings. Nevertheless, some 
anthropologists, Bloch and Sperber included, stood strong against this anti-theory tide 
and are developing a scientific understanding of human beings. Ingold, on the other 
hand, seems oblivious to this trend, simply dismissing such work as selectionist and 
hence inadequate. 
It is obvious in this discussion that lack of space as well as a lack of knowledge of 
each other’s work has lead to simplistic views in which the central issues remain rather 
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obscure. In what follows I will discuss more extensively the views and goals of both 
authors concerning neo-Darwinist theorizing of culture and concerning anthropology 
as a scientific discipline. I will first outline Bloch’s views as these are given in his more 
recent publications. Scholars of religion who build their theories upon an evolutionary 
psychology basis will find much they agree with and see parallels for in the study of 
religion.  However, I will then contrast these with Ingold’s in an attempt to highlight 
the real differences and to show how Bloch’s and similar proposals are to be seen as 
attempts to make things cozy in a narrow closet while Ingold’s work allows for the 
opening of a door. In other words, some fundamental issues will come to the surface 
that scholars of religion cannot leave untouched. 
Where did anthropology Go? Or Bloch’s need for “Human Nature” 
On the 24th of February 2005, Maurice Bloch held the public LSE1 lecture, 
titled “The Rehabilitation of ‘Human Nature’. Or Where Did Anthropology Go?”. 
He laments the fact that scholars from outside anthropology, interested in general 
questions about human beings, and interested in finding out what they could learn 
from anthropology, knock on their colleagues’ door in vain. The reason is simply that 
anthropology lacks a generalizing theoretical framework and is a discipline without a 
centre, fragmented. Ironically, this is due to developments within the discipline itself 
in which the original centre, the study of human beings, was slowly corroded from the 
inside. As he notes with Sperber, the theoretical history of anthropology can be seen as 
unidirectional: “it is the history of the gradual abandonment of belief in the possibil-
ity of anthropology as a generalizing science. It assumes that because human beings 
can transmit information between individuals through symbolic communication they 
are entirely free of any natural constraints and essentially different from other animals, 
who transmit most, if not all, information genetically” (Bloch & Sperber 2002:725). 
For Bloch, however, this road into oblivion is not the only road anthropology can take 
and, in the LSE lecture, a brief overview of the history of the discipline is given to 
point out another possibility that will allow for an anthropology as a scientific under-
taking. In his narrative, Bloch points out a positive heritage from the evolutionism/
diffusionism debate that anthropology should reclaim: that is, the diffusionist reac-
tion to evolutionism includes a profound point about the nature of human beings, 
“i.e. the revolutionary historical implications of the kind of brain possessed by Homo 
Sapiens with its ability to communicate” (Bloch 2005). For Bloch, anthropology’s goal 
1  London School of Economics and Political Science.
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should be to draw out the implications of the continual transformation of people in 
the complex cumulative socio-historical process. “The implications of focusing on the 
ability of humans to imitate and borrow information and then to pass it on to another 
by non-genetic means is genuinely far reaching. It is what makes culture possible” 
(Bloch 2005). 
However, earlier overreactions should be avoided. The “contrary, usually totally 
unexamined, philosophical jump from materialism to the purest of idealism” by 
removing internal human nature as the determinant source of what happens in history 
and replacing it with factors which are external is one example of such an overreac-
tion. It ultimately results in a pure constructionism and culturalism stuck in a world 
of only representations. Another closely related overreaction is anthropology’s blown 
up sensitivity to ethnocentrism that has resulted in “an absolute injunction, i.e., that 
we should never judge or evaluate others by the categories or standards of our culture 
or indeed by any standards at all”. “Such a position”, Bloch argues, “can easily slip 
into a much more radical claim that any generalisation, which will inevitably use an 
external basis for generalisation, is always illegitimate because it will always be noth-
ing but the projection of the anthropologists’ way of thinking” (Bloch 2005). For 
Bloch, the situation is simple. If anthropology wants a place on the academic map, 
the idea of a ‘common human nature’ cannot be abandoned. Anthropologists need to 
take up the basic anthropological questions again. As long as they don’t, others will 
fill the vacuum and do so without the insights anthropology can bring to the table. 
Bloch summarizes this possible particular input under the notion of ‘functionalism’, 
which he understands as 
a commitment to seeing culture as existing in the process of actual people’s lives, in specific 
places, as a part of the wider ecological process of life, rather than as a disembodied system 
of traits, beliefs, symbols, representations, etc. … For functionalism the mental exists in 
the practical, and both are conjoined functions of bodies in the wider ecology of life…. 
It requires, therefore, a form of epistemological monism, uniting people and the environ-
ment, the mental and the biological, nature and culture. … Functionalism enables us to 
recognise the inseparable totality created by the particularisms of the specificity of human 
history and the properties of natural being in the natural world. It can therefore continue 
the difficult anthropological enterprise and pick up again the empirical and theoretical job 
of understanding an animal involved in history. (Bloch 2005)
The image that arises from Bloch’s response to Ingold is that the latter considers all 
selectionists as replicationists using an outdated notion of culture. The consequence is 
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that Ingold is blind for some positive developments, even in his own discipline, in which 
evolutionary theory is combined with a theory of culture that neither collapses in simple 
materialism, nor evaporates in simple idealism. In fact, Bloch and Ingold agree in their 
criticism of memeticism, while they differ on the usefulness of evolutionary psychology. 
For Bloch, Ingold’s allergy for the latter seems simply a consequence of not seeing an 
important difference. In a critical discussion of memeticism, Bloch points out that one 
of the crucial lessons to learn from anthropologists, himself and Sperber included, is 
that “the transmission of culture is not a matter of passing on ‘bits of culture’ as though 
they were a rugby ball being thrown from player to player. Nothing is passed on; rather, 
a communication link is established which then requires an act of re-creation on the 
part of the receiver” (Bloch 2000:199). In other words, the view of cultural transmis-
sion as a simple process of replication that Ingold rejects, is not the only scenario for a 
naturalist theory of culture.  Bloch as well as Sperber reject the  memeticists’ bits and 
pieces view on culture, because that what might have been a distinct unit in commu-
nication, is in the process of recreation transformed totally and integrated into a differ-
ent mental universe, loosing its identity and specificity. (Bloch 2000:199) In a 2002 
article on “Kinship and Evolved Psychological Dispositions”, Bloch and Sperber present 
the epidemiological model of representations as the way forward for an anthropology 
that wants to tackle general questions. The model is defended by pointing out that it 
recognizes on the one hand that cultural representations and practices are specific to a 
community at a time in its history (rather than mere tokens of a general type) and on 
the other hand, that they are, in essential respects, grounded in the common evolved 
psychology of human beings. (Bloch & Sperber 2002: 723) That is, epidemiology lets 
them have it all: human nature, culture, universality and particularity, and last but not 
least, the possibility of an anthropology as science involving comparison. The reason for 
this generosity is simply the resolution of a previously committed error: The finding 
that humans differ from animals, because they can change with representations that are 
made possible by the learning and computational potential of the human brain, was 
linked to the idea that the contents of these representations were “not at all constrained 
by or even influenced by genetically inherited brain “hardware” (Bloch & Sperber 
2002:725). The idea was that humans were liberated through culture from their biol-
ogy, their nature, which subsequently left the anthropological scene. The epidemiology 
model, however, allows for a naturalistic explanation of cultural phenomena, by invok-
ing “two kinds of small-scale processes: psychological processes within individuals and 
physical, biological, and psycho-physical interactions between individuals and their 
immediate environment (including interactions with other individuals) that we call 
“ecological processes” (Bloch & Sperber 2002:726-727).
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Considering himself a well-disposed social anthropologist, Bloch shares with his 
colleagues the uncomfortableness they have with an idea of culture as too decontextualized 
from the practice of ordinary life and subscribes to the view that knowledge is quite often 
implicit and intimately implicated in action and interaction. His advice to memeticists 
is that “[i]t is therefore better to consider culture not as a set of propositions but as an 
only partially conscious resource, or perhaps even as a process used in making inferences 
which inform action – a process which, in any case, occurs at such a speed as to make it 
necessarily implicit” (Bloch 2000:200). Such a notion of culture allows for the following 
considerations: often this type of ‘culture’, on which inferences are based, is often at odds 
with explicit beliefs whether these come from participants or those studying them, espe-
cially if the latter take the participant’s point of view, their declarations and the symbolic 
aspects of their behavior, seriously on the level of explanation. “Representations would 
seem strangely “right,” “attractive,” “natural,” or “obvious” to people. This would be the 
case without individuals’ being at all sure why these representations had these qualities, 
and even if they gave reasons these reasons would often be merely post hoc rationaliza-
tions” (Bloch & Sperber 2002:732). Culture, thus for Bloch, exists on many levels and is 
learnt implicitly or explicitly in a great variety of ways.  “It is not a library of propositions 
or memes…. Knowledge is extremely complex, of many different kinds, and impossible 
to locate, as though it were of a single type” (Bloch 2000:200). Furthermore, the insepa-
rability of knowledge from action and context, likewise involves a complex view on trans-
mission as being of many types and as itself part of practice (Bloch 2000:201). Whereas in 
Darwinizing Culture (2000), other contributors easily talk of the transmission of informa-
tion, with memes as units of information2 it is clear that Bloch as well as Sperber go far 
beyond this notion of culture in their ‘naturalization’ of the discipline through the use of 
evolutionary psychology ideas. Culture, in their model, is part of ‘the flow of information’ 
that links all members of a human community to each other across time and space. It is 
that part of information about the people themselves, their environment, their past, their 
beliefs, their desires and fears, skills and practices that is rather stable in content and shared 
by many or even most members of the community. (Bloch & Sperber 2002:726) Such a 
flow of information takes place both in individual brains/minds as in the shared environ-
ment of these individual brains/minds. But, as noted before, the individual brains/minds 
are not just media in which simple replication occurs. Rather, public representations are 
recreated into private representations, which again are recreated into public representa-
tions for the flow to go on. These processes of recreation depend on and are constrained by 
2  See Robert Aunger, Darwinizing Culture: The Status of Memetics as a Science. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), pp. 1,2,3,5,8…
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characteristics of the human brain. However, by recognizing the flow of information the 
epidemiological model does not deny the complexity of the process of human history. “It 
fully recognizes that culture is both in us and outside—that it is not (even remotely) just 
a matter of human beings with genetically determined mind/brains reacting to diverse 
environments according to the dictates of their nature” (Bloch & Sperber 2002:729). 
The model seeks to explain the transformation and stabilization of representations in the 
process of cultural transmission invoking both mind-external ecological factors and mind-
internal psychological/biological factors, suggesting not a direct link between biological 
factors and the generation of representations but an indirect relationship of genetically 
favored receptivity to specific information. Because of an evolved disposition, people 
attend to certain information or even seek it, retain it, use it to guide their behavior, and 
become, in turn, transmitters of such information. Hence, the generosity: the epidemio-
logical model allows for a recognition of complexity and of “the unique fact that humans 
are beings that, in a strong and important sense, make themselves”, while still leaving 
room “for considering, inter alia, the role of factors such as human psychological disposi-
tions resulting from natural evolution” (Bloch & Sperber 2002:729). A middle road is 
found: cultural representations are neither just simple phenotypic expressions of genes, 
nor are they simple social-scale projections of the individual mind. “Actual cultural prac-
tices, as performed by specific individuals at a given time, are embedded in the sociohis-
torical processes that have distributed, stabilized, and transformed cultural representations 
and practices in the population to which these individuals belong. Each of these historical 
flows is unique. These processes are influenced by many types of factors, evolved psycho-
logical predispositions being only one of them. Mostly, cultural processes are influenced 
by other cultural processes” (Bloch & Sperber 2002:729).
Who studies humanity? The scope of anthropology according to Ingold
For Bloch, Ingold represents those anthropologists who want to withdraw from 
science and specialize in particularism and navel-gazing. Yet, twenty years before Bloch’s 
LSE lecture Tim Ingold addressed a similar question in Anthropology Today. In a two 
page article Ingold ventilates his unease with developments in British social anthropol-
ogy, worries especially about the fact that “anthropologists have abandoned the study of 
mankind” (Ingold 1985:15) and is frustrated since any attempt to refocus the discipline 
on humanity as such, receives the message “that the introduction of biological, psycho-
logical or evolutionary perspectives into discussions of human culture or social life is ‘not 
proper anthropology’” (Ingold 1985:15). Such introduction is seen as futile and even 
detrimental to the progress of the discipline. An emphasis is placed on symbolic struc-
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tures that can be considered without reference to the underlying conditions and processes 
of human life. The subject matter is no longer humankind but culture or society, or what 
Ingold considers worse, socio-cultural systems. A wall is set up between social and cultural 
anthropology on one side and biology and psychology on the other, with no possibility of 
constructive dialogue, mutual understanding and effective synthesis. At the same time, 
ethnography is considered as an end in itself. Students are no longer taught how to go 
beyond the awareness of cultural diversity to develop a more fundamental grasp of our 
common humanity, or in other words, how to leap from ‘other cultures’ to mankind. This 
means that theory that “enables us”, according to Ingold, “to make this kind of leap from 
the particular to the general, from questions of what makes humans of different kinds 
to the question of what makes us human” (Ingold 1985:15) is no longer considered an 
integral part of anthropology and anthropology courses. Like Bloch, Ingold deplores the 
introvert navel-gazing attitude of much anthropology, points out as well that it is a bad 
moment even in 1985 to close the door, at a moment that other disciplines offer insights 
of real consequence for understanding the evolution of human culture and society. Like 
Bloch, Ingold sees how this absence of theorizing about humanity leaves a vacuum “that 
the more bigoted practitioners of other disciplines are only too eager to fill, projecting 
their partial and lop-sided views of man as though they embraced all that there is of human 
existence” (Ingold 1985:16). For Ingold, then, in 1985, anthropology could and should 
make a central contribution to bridging the divisions between disciplines. “Occupying 
the middle ground between naturalism and humanism, anthropology is uniquely quali-
fied to relate and translate the concepts and insights of historians and sociologists to those 
of biologists and psychologists, and vice versa” (Ingold 1985:16).
Did Ingold since then make a turn of 180 degrees? It seems not, since he recently 
repeated much of his previous frustrations and misgivings and renewed his plea for an 
anthropology as science, that is, for an anthropology that focuses on its potential contri-
bution to the scientific understanding of human beings and their forms of life (Ingold 
2004:177). That he makes this plea, however, in an introduction titled ‘Anthropology after 
Darwin’ and that he describes this anthropology as ‘a science of engagement in a relational 
world’ shows that on some fundamental point his views have become quite different from 
Bloch’s.3 Somewhere along the road, Ingold did make a turn. The reason lies in an important 
part of his research project. Since 1985 Ingold has delved into the underbelly of evolutionary 
3  In 1985 Ingold’s views seem quite compatible with Bloch’s. He points out that anthropologists ask absurd questions 
about why this or that aspect of human behaviour is essentially ‘cultural’ rather than ‘biological’ simply because they turned a blind 
eye to the innate components of behavioural disposition. As a consequence, what they offer is a view of how culture substitutes for 
the animal in man, while a view could and should be developed on how culture completes the human animal (Ingold 1985:16).
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theory. Whereas Bloch takes Darwinian evolutionary theory for granted and only attempts 
to reinterpret ‘culture’ as representations that are also somehow constrained by biological 
factors, Ingold sees problems in both anthropology and biology that are linked in a mutually 
perpetuating pattern. In the following parts I will discuss this: first, I will outline Ingold’s 
views on an important difference between Darwin’s The Origin of Species and The Descent of 
Man and the problem that arose from it; second, I will discuss how the solution given to 
this particular problem involves essentialist thinking and has been persistent due to reduc-
tions that have held each other in check. It will become clear that by paying attention to 
discussions and new developments in biology, such as developmental systems theory, and by 
taking a critical anthropological look at Darwin’s legacy, Ingold can embark upon a road for 
a scientific anthropology that is fundamentally different from Bloch’s proposal. Scholars of 
religion, involved in similar discussions concerning religion and culture and concerning the 
scientific character of their discipline, cannot ignore these fundamental debates and will have 
to make a deliberated choice for either one or the other trajectory. 
The underbelly of Darwinian thought
Evolutionary theory, human equality and a two-streams view
Ingold points out that The Origin of Species and The Descent of Man are works of 
very different kinds. Whereas in the first human beings are hardly mentioned while 
‘descent with modification’ is the central argument, in The Descent of Man, the human 
being appears as the central subject matter. The change in focus comes, however, with 
a shift that will open the door for drifting back to pre-Darwinian essentialist think-
ing. Ingold explains it as follows. In The Origin of Species, Darwin had simply described 
himself as a spectator, watching the panorama of nature. He belonged to that species 
capable of seeing things other animals could not. Whereas animals were “destined to 
live within the world of nature, Darwin could write as though he himself were above it, 
and could observe it in the manner of a spectacle” (Ingold 2004b:210). In The Descent 
of Man, however, this possibility of watching from above becomes part of the subject 
matter as characteristic of man in contrast to the rest of the animal kingdom. “How 
was it, then, that human beings – or at least the more civilised among them – could 
reach such an exalted position? Whereas in The Origin of Species, Darwin had described 
the view from the summit, in The Descent of Man he offered an account of the climb” 
(Ingold 2004b:210). As a consequence, whereas The Origin of Species brings a story that 
naturally leads into innumerable directions, The Descent of Man establishes a single scale 
from the most primitive of animals to the most advanced of humans - those capable of 
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being spectators of the panorama of nature - and tells the story of a gradual liberation 
from the shackles of instincts through reason. In other words, the dichotomy between 
reason and nature or between intellect and instinct that in pre-Darwinian thought 
had informed views of an essential difference between humans and animals was not 
dispensed with. Rather, it became for Darwin a matter of gradation. “[T]he evolution 
of species in nature was also an evolution out of it, in so far as it progressively liberated 
the mind from the promptings of innate disposition” (Ingold 2004b: 211). 
Darwin’s story of gradualism, however, with ancestors becoming human by degree 
over countless of generations, didn’t fit well with the Enlightenment view of a ‘psychic 
unity of mankind’. For Darwin, Ingold points out, the difference between scientist and 
savage was not a matter of a differential development of intellectual capacities they 
had in common, but of a difference of capacity comparable to that which accounted 
for the difference between savage and ape. “Throughout human history, the advance 
of civilisation was supposed to march hand-in-hand with the evolution of the brain – 
and with it the intellectual and moral faculties – through a process of natural selection 
in which ‘tribes have supplanted other tribes’, the victorious groups always including 
the larger proportion of ‘well-endowed men’” (Darwin 1874:197 quoted in Ingold 
2004b:212). In other words, Darwin’s sketch of man’s decent could only work if what 
he considered ‘the ascendancy of reason’ could be attributed to hereditary endowment, 
quite a problematic view when human equality is high on the list. In his work Ingold 
narrates how the subsequent search for reconciliation between evolutionary theory 
and human equality led to the introduction of a difference in kind drawing a clear line 
between ape and human. For him, the appeal to an essentialist, thus pre-Darwinian, 
concept of human nature is a defensive reaction against the legacy of racist science left 
by Darwin’s argument in The Descent of Man. In that reaction, humans were made “to 
appear different in degree, not kind, from their evolutionary antecedents by attribut-
ing the movement of history to a process of culture that differs in kind, not degree, 
from the process of biological evolution” (Ingold 2004b:214). That is, solutions were 
found combining evolutionary theory and the thesis of ‘the psychic unity of mankind’ 
into a story with two axes of change: “There is one process of evolution, leading from 
our ape-like ancestors to human beings that are recognizably of the same kind as 
ourselves; another process, of culture or history, leading from humanity’s primitive 
past to modern science and civilization” (Ingold 2004b:213). This two-streams view 
can be found all over the academic place. Tylor, for instance, is the hero in Bloch’s 
narrative of anthropology because he recognized that the evolution of the human 
brain had led to the possibility that information could replicate, persist and trans-
form by other means than DNA. As a consequence, “human history had a different 
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character to the history of other animals” (Bloch 2000:190). Similarly, evolutionary 
psychology is built on the same solution. “[T]he psychic unity of mankind is genu-
ine and not just an ideological fiction”, Tooby and Cosmides (1992:79) state. We all 
share the capacities that came into being during the evolutionary process that finally 
distinguished man from ape; nevertheless, though engineers and scientists share these 
capacities with hunter-gatherers from the Upper Palaeolithic, they differ because of 
the separate process of history or as some would like to term it ‘cultural evolution’. 
Thus, whereas evolutionary psychologists and anthropologists not afraid of looking for 
natural constraints to culture differ from culturalists by refusing to lock themselves 
up in a world of representations in a hypersensitive reaction to naturalist theorizing, 
they nevertheless share with them Darwin’s legacy that led us down the two-streams 
path. Looking through the Darwinian looking glass, we have learned to see double and 
now simply discuss how to connect the two. “Whether one prefers to view religion as 
a phenomenon that natural selection has hard-wired into our phenotypes, a cultural 
invention that human beings have developed along the way, or an untidy mix of both 
“nature and nurture,” the same Darwinian toolbox can be called upon to make sense 
of things” (Day 2005:81-82).
Unfortunately, one can argue, with Ingold and others that the reconciliation 
between evolution theory and human equality came with a high price. To make this 
work, cultural history was set apart as different in kind from the process of evolution. 
Furthermore, in the process of separation a problematic reduction was carried through, 
through a notion of information that allowed for the reinterpretation of ‘descent with 
modification’ as a story of genetics, and human history as a story of the cultural trans-
mission of representations. 
Gene centeredness, imaginary genotypes and beyond
One product of this two-streams reconciliation of evolution theory and human 
equality, has been the imaginary genotype. As Ingold and others involved in devel-
opmental systems theory have noticed, a notion of information helped in stabilizing 
it: a gene is seen to be not simply a string of DNA that interacts with its immediate 
environment but a carrier of information that encodes a particular trait or character. The 
notion of information was borrowed from a 1940s theory of information that used the 
term in the sense of referring to these differences in the input to a system that made a 
difference in the output, without any semantic value involved. However, Ingold points 
out, molecular biologists, recognizing that this notion of information was applicable to 
DNA that could thus be seen as a form of digital information in the technical, informa-
tion-theoretic sense, nevertheless interpreted DNA as a code with a specific semantic 
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content. As Griffiths notes, in many discussions of genetic information one can easily 
find traces of the idea that genes have meaning in something like the way that human 
thought and language are considered to have meaning. In other words, involved is an 
intentional notion of information of which a central feature is that it retains its iden-
tity in the face of misrepresentation or, in the case of imperative representations, non-
compliance. Whereas a technical notion of information involves no notion of falsehood 
or non-compliance, intentional representations can be false and intentional imperatives 
can be disobeyed. As a consequence, whereas in the first case one has a relationship 
between a material cause and its effect, one has in the second case quite a different rela-
tionship between an intentional imperative and its effect. (Griffiths 2005:187)
Such an intentional or semantic notion of information allows for the idea that 
all human beings share the same human nature as encoded in the genotype that is 
transmitted from generation to generation because of one fundamental characteristic: 
intentional information is intrinsically context insensitive since unexpected outputs 
can be dismissed as misrepresentations or failure to comply. In genetic language 
this means that the ‘meaning’ of a gene does not change, rather non-genetic factors 
merely prevent the instruction from being obeyed. Understanding genes as intentional 
imperatives thus implies the possibility that they are messages which can be moved 
easily from one context to another, hence allowing for the possibility of genetic trans-
mission of a prespecified human nature. Genes appear in this perspective as God-like 
prime movers themselves unmoved. Pre-Darwinian Aristotelian thinking of essences 
with variations seen as “the accidental results of a natural developmental process that 
had been hijacked by one interfering force or another,” (Day 2005:62) is back with a 
vengeance. 
To make it work, though, those properties of human beings that are taken to be 
encoded as part of human nature and thus evolved by natural selection are redescribed 
in a way that factors out all variation that is ostensibly due to environmental experi-
ence. As Ingold writes, one seeks
… to produce for each [property] an abstract, context-independent specification. This 
abstraction is then ‘read in’ to the genome – as if it had a concrete presence in there – so that 
development itself can be seen as a ‘reading off’, under particular environmental conditions, 
of a pre-existing specification. The circularity of this argument needs no further elaboration, 
and is one reason, of course, why it has proved so hard to refute. (Ingold 2004b:215)
Similarly, Griffiths describes this move as crossing out development and context 
in favor of a black-box strategy in which genes are treated as if the transmission of a 
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chunk of chromosome explained in and of itself the ‘transmission’ of the phenotypic 
character.4 To summarize, the understanding of genes as semantic intentional informa-
tion comes with a high price: a persistence of gene centeredness and genetic determin-
ism combined with a strong tendency to marginalize context and development. For 
Susan Oyama (2001), who noted this problematic connection in 1985, it is clear that 
when genes are understood in terms of information metaphors, they will continue to 
be regarded as controlling development and representing what the organism is “meant 
to be” while the tendency to minimize context sensitivity and developmental contin-
gency will persist. As Griffiths notes, “Neo-Darwinism was the result of the union 
of Darwin’s theory of natural selection with a particular view of heredity” (Griffiths 
& Gray 2001:215). Developmental systems theory allows for a different notion of 
heredity that brings developmental processes back into the evolutionary picture, thus 
opening up new and promising research agendas.5 Rather than thinking development 
as the determination of a phenotypic ‘resultant’ by a number of causal ‘vectors’, a more 
active perspective is taken seeing development as the dynamic self-organization of a 
total field of relationships in which an organism’s life unfolds and in which properties 
and capacities are seen neither as somehow internally prespecified nor as externally 
imposed, but as arising from these dynamic processes. (Ingold 2001:130) What 
Ingold and others propose is a shift from neo-Darwinian decontextualizing ‘popula-
tion’ thinking to a relational thinking that treats the gene as a string of DNA always 
in interaction with its environment and the organism “not as a discrete, pre-specified 
entity but as a particular locus of growth and development within a continuous field 
of relationships” (Ingold 2004b:218).
Representation-centeredness, imaginary cultural systems and beyond
Another product of this two-streams reconciliation of evolutionary theory and human 
equality has been the notions of culture and cultural transmission, both connected to imagi-
nary sets of representations, information, mental models and beliefs. Since what makes us 
4  Day, arguing that as long as one can identify “offspring” and “parents” and thus identify cultural path-
ways of descent one can use the Darwinian toolbox without the need for clear ideas about the substrate and means of 
transmission, seems in danger of introducing an equally problematic variant of such a black-box strategy in the study 
of religion.
5  On this point there is a disagreement between Tim Ingold and Developmental Systems Theory. The theory 
replaces genes as units of selection by developmental systems but still seeks to keep the fundamental Darwinian logic of 
variation under natural selection, thus reintroducing the problems that come with such logic, such as decontextualiza-
tion and ruptures of the continuity of the relational field. Though this is an important point of discussion in which I 
tend to side with Ingold, I will not address it here. See Ingold (2002).
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equal is considered to be the product of biological inheritance, working through the trans-
mission of genetic information encoded in the DNA, to explain what makes us different a 
supplement process of transmission of non-genetic information seemed like a nice comple-
tion of the picture. Humans are considered to have the evolved capacity to make sense of 
their world, and render the world meaningful through representations that either can be 
assembled in the mind or communicated verbally to others, or can be the result of a complex 
combination of both. The idea of mind as an information processing device with in- and 
outputs fitted right in. The part of representations that seems cross-generationally transmit-
ted through non-genetic means, a process that nevertheless depends upon the presence, in all 
human minds, of innate, species-typical mechanisms of cognition, is culture. However, as in 
the case of genes, an argument can be made that such a view is the result of a notion of infor-
mation that allows for ignoring context, blackbox strategies and the selection and centraliza-
tion of one element, which is given a semantic context-independent interpretation. 
Of course, much time in anthropology and the study of religion has been spend to 
argue for the need to contextualize the specific content of these representations, resulting 
ultimately in a paralyzing relativism, and needless to say that, often in reaction to this 
trend, this notion of culture as representations has been remodeled time and again to include 
practice-related knowledge and less conscious forms of knowledge, going as far as Bloch’s 
remark that one should not consider “culture as a set of propositions but as an only partially 
conscious resource, or perhaps even as a process used in making inferences which inform 
action – a process which, in any case, occurs at such a speed as to make it necessarily implicit” 
(Bloch 2000:200). The assumption long present in anthropology that “culture is inseparably 
linked to language, on the grounds either that culture is thought and transmitted as text 
through language, or that culture is ultimately ‘language-like’, consisting of linked linear 
propositions” is thoroughly questioned by Bloch, using connectionist theory in the cognitive 
sciences to make his point. (Bloch 1998:4)6 It is obvious that Bloch goes to great lengths to 
6  On the same basis, Bloch criticizes Sperber, Boyer and others who developed a cognitive approach that takes 
religion to consist of counterintuitive beliefs, their catchiness taken to explain the persistence of religion. Bloch even 
raises the question “whether the focus on “belief,” counter-intuitive or not, as the core concern in dealing with religion, is 
not misleading for the type of phenomena under examination, such as ancestor worship.” Informed by his own fieldwork 
among the Malagasy, Bloch sees the idea of counterintuitive beliefs as typically Christian and argues that Sperber and 
Boyer are misled in thinking that all religious manifestations are cognitively and saliently counter-intuitive, in the same 
way the missionaries were only looking for that type of belief in their contact with Malagasy people. In other words, with 
Bloch, we come close again to a rejection of the concept of religion as part of a western discourse, as he comes to question 
the universal usefulness of the notion of ‘religion’: “the English term “religion” normally indicates phenomena which 
imply a consideration of strange “beliefs” with an explicit and clearly emphasized counter-intuitive element… This is 
because the partic ular history of the Semitic religions, especially Christianity, influenced as it was by Platonism, made 
faith in the not-fully-knowable the touch stone of what religion is.” See Bloch (2002:129-146).
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argue both for ‘human nature’ as well as ‘culture’ while trying to avoid too easy generaliza-
tions and the universalization of Western notions and assumptions. What he doesn’t see, 
however, and thus what keeps him finally stuck in a two-streams framework after all, is that 
Christian notions not only inform our thinking about culture and cultural transmission, but 
about genes and genetic inheritance as well. As a consequence, his functionalism, goes far, 
but not far enough. For Bloch, the implausibility of culture as language, as text or proposi-
tions, is due to the fact that much knowledge is of an implicit non-verbal nature and is a 
sign that what cognitive sciences have to say about processes of learning and storage (Bloch 
1998:4), and evolutionary psychologists about innate potentials, should be taken seriously. 
It is this reflection that informs his strong reaction against Ingold’s apparent careless throw-
ing together of memeticists, sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists into one homo-
geneous group. Whereas memeticists simply see culture in terms of selfish memes eagerly 
transmitting themselves in total oblivion to biological constraints, while sociobiologists 
go straight from gene to representation, evolutionary psychologists courageously choose to 
open the black box of cultural transmission. Similar arguments in favor of an evolutionary 
psychology or cognitive approach are made in the study of religion accusing humanistic, 
hermeneutical or culturalist studies of religion to black box cultural transmission. Attention 
is paid to the process of cultural transmission, no longer simply seen as a process of replica-
tion but of recreation and a complex interplay of genetic, environmental and cultural factors 
is laid bare. Taking a connectionist view of the mind, Bloch can argue that knowledge is 
to a large extent non-linguistic, involving implicit networks of meaning which are formed 
through the experience of, and practice in, the external world. (Bloch 1998:7) 
However, as Ingold points out in his reply to Bloch, differences can still hide an 
underlying similarity. All the above mentioned approaches rest upon a common assump-
tion: all these selectionists share the assumption that culture consists in information or 
content that is, in whatever form, to be socially transmitted. Opening the black box of 
social or cultural transmission within a neo-Darwinian framework that still takes genes 
as semantic codes while ‘watering down’ the linguistic or propositional ring of culture as 
representations by making them implicit, subconscious or faster than lightning, is like 
fighting an imaginary rat in the lion’s cage. The original mistake of decontextualization + 
centralization of representations to make it all fit is not undone. In Ingold’s words, a verti-
cal process of inversion is sold as a lateral process of translation. Whereas anthropologists 
have described their business as a matter of translating alien ideas, beliefs and concepts in 
terms comprehensible to their western audience, Ingold describes their business rather as 
representing “the experience of everyday life for the people among whom the anthropolo-
gist has lived … in an analytic discourse that seeks at every juncture to deny the reality 
and constitutive force of the relationships that those people have with one another and 
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with their environments, and that underwrite their sense of belonging to locality and 
community” (Ingold 1993:218). Individuals are cut loose from their relational environ-
ment while the latter is translated into a factor influencing what is taken to be going 
on in the individual’s mind. Parallel with the reduction of biology to genetics, much 
anthropological theorizing since Tylor reduces human history to the cultural transmission 
of information and knowledge from one mind to another. Whereas “population thinking” 
leads to a consideration of organisms as discrete individuals who are only able to generate 
stable patterns of properties and behavior through a genetic transmission of information, 
likewise such “non-relational population thinking” considers generations of humans as 
discrete entities that generate stable patterns over time through the additional process 
of a cultural transmission of information.7 The imaginary genotype finds its counterpart: 
imaginary cultural systems. The mistake made is the same: abstraction is made of the 
organism’s or person’s relational field with characteristics generated in that field being 
attributed to either genetic make-up or the inner contents of the mind. Transmission 
is than brought in to stitch everything up again. But what results is a Frankenstein. 
For Ingold the metaphor of transmission is deeply misleading no matter whether it is 
attributed to genes or culture or a complex interaction of both. Whereas Bloch seems to 
categorize him as an anthropologist radically choosing culture in the question of the rela-
tion between ‘genetic endowment’ and ‘culture’ in humans, Ingold replies by dismissing 
the question as betraying “a faulty notion of both genes and culture, as intergen erationally 
transmitted information” (Ingold 2000c:27).
Whereas developmental systems theory goes beyond gene centeredness through a 
disconnection of genes and the semantic notion of information, a similar move can help 
us to go beyond a representation centeredness towards a refocus upon developmental 
systems.  More precisely, Ingold argues for a disconnection of the notions of informa-
tion and knowledge. A disconnection between gene and intentional information allows 
for the study of the gene not as overall important but as one element among others in 
a developmental system in which properties and capacities of organisms arise. Similarly 
a disconnection of information and knowledge allows for a decentralization and reinter-
pretation of representations as part of that same developmental system. That is, if devel-
opmental systems theory has a point and “humans are not assembled, robot-like, from 
prefabricated components, but undergo growth and develop ment within matrices of 
environmental relation ships”, (Ingold 2000b:25) then it follows, as Ingold points out, 
that human knowledgeability is no longer to be seen as founded in some combination of 
7  Peter Pels shows how Tylor’s views about the progress of mankind are likewise a result of statistical think-
ing. See Pels (2003).
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innate capacities and acquired competence, but in skill. In other words, through the lens 
of developmental systems theory, skill becomes the foundation of all knowledge (Ingold 
2001:135). Cognitive studies focusing on the process of becoming an expert in games, 
such as tetris, - which Bloch (1998:15,17,18) mentions as well,- are quite useful here, and 
allow, for instance, for an understanding of verbal statements not so much as knowledge 
in themselves but as pointers opening up a path to knowledge or to further enskilment, 
through an education of the attention. 
It is however important to realize at this point that Ingold goes further than most if 
not all of such cognitive studies of skill by taking processes of enskilment as the overall 
baseline. For human beings, being intrinsically part of a developmental system, gaining 
knowledge is not a matter of information transmission but a process of enskilment under 
the guidance of expert others who through the education of attention redirect the novice’s 
practical engagement with his or her environment. In short, learning is a matter of guided 
rediscovery. Though Bloch recognizes, with connectionist cognitive studies in mind, that 
“anthropology has tried to analyse culture through folk modes of thought applicable 
only to sentential logical knowledge, which… is but a small part of knowledge,” (Bloch 
1998:15) he nevertheless remains solidly within a neo-Darwinian framework that keeps 
him talking in terms of flows of information and representations that are transmitted 
through a process of recreation. He, in contrast to Ingold, comes short of fully revis-
ing central anthropological notions in light of processes of enskilment and engagement 
in a relational world. Cultural knowledge is still considered to be transmitted, though 
through processes that are unknown by those involved and brought to light in evolution-
ary psychology (Bloch 1998:7). However, if people contribute to the knowledgeability of 
the next generation “not by handing down a corpus of representations, but by setting up, 
through their activities, the environmental contexts within which successors develop their 
own embodied skill of perception and action,” (Ingold 2001:141) then it must be obvious 
that all ‘culture’ related notions, such as tradition, cultural traditions, and for that matter, 
religious traditions, religious belief, etc. are in need of a revision based on theoretical as 
well as empirical studies informed by a developmental systems view. 
Conclusion
To conclude, I agree with Armin Geertz, Matthew Day and many others that 
Darwinian theory and cognitive science should be taken very seriously in the study 
of religion. However, rather than browsing through it, considering the Darwinian 
perspective simply as established and using the tools uncritically for every job that 
comes along, we can conclude from Ingold’s analysis and from developmental systems 
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theory that we should consider it as a crucial piece of theory to be critically exam-
ined and worked upon if we want to make progress in human science. We can agree, 
parallel with Bloch’s and Ingold’s plea for a scientific anthropology, that the endeavor 
to develop a scientific study of religion as part of a scientific study of human beings 
is of great importance. However, we cannot simply assume that this means taking 
‘human nature’ into account. Though on many points Bloch’s and Ingold’s work 
seems extremely close, both emphasizing for instance the importance of an outdoor 
perspective or an ‘in the wild’ perspective that studies human beings in their envi-
ronment, both emphasizing the importance of context and practices, and thus not 
surprisingly both enthusiast about for instance Ed Hutchins’ work on distributed 
knowledge and Jean Lave’s work on apprentice learning, it should by now be obvious 
that at the same time their views are miles apart. Whereas Bloch happily subscribes 
to the Neo-Darwinian reconciliation of evolutionary theory and human equality and 
happily talks at one time about the interactions of genes and environment while at 
other times emphasizing cultural complexity and particularity, Ingold prefers to undo 
this problematic solution, by refusing to work with the imaginary “genotype” and its 
cultural counterpart, as well the distinction between nature and culture and the divi-
sion between an individual mind equipped with mental models, even if of an implicit 
kind, and the world that these models represent. What we have are two fundamen-
tally different views on human reality, the first based on a rather uncritical acceptance 
of the basic assumptions and framework of neo-Darwinism that has the air of being 
established, the second, still very much in its infancy and emerging out of a critical 
evaluation of that legacy. If Ingold’s analysis of the Darwinian legacy is accurate and 
developmental systems theory has a point, we in the study of religion will have to 
consider the implications of such a change in perspective for our own subject matter. 
But even more, if a scientific study is what we want, we will not only have to draw out 
the implications, but, in my estimation, we should see studying religion as a contribu-
tion to the development of ‘a science of engagement in a relational world’. 
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Abstract
The trend to take Darwin’s legacy seriously in the study of religion is gaining 
momentum. Especially in the cognitive approach to religion that builds its work 
on evolutionary psychology it allows for explanations bridging nature and culture. 
However, this seriousness usually does not involve a critical attitude towards (neo-) 
Darwinian theory which is simply considered ‘established’. In this article I want to 
warn against the rather uncritical attitude that results from this, by pointing out 
the controversial nature of some underlying assumptions. A debate in anthropology 
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between Maurice Bloch and Tim Ingold allows me to bring these underlying issues to 
the surface. Both share the view that anthropology should contribute to a science of 
human beings, both deplore much of the current situation in that discipline. However, 
for Bloch a scientific anthropology simply means taking seriously neo-Darwinian 
theory. Ingold on the other hand, makes a more extensive evaluation of anthropology 
and its link to Darwinian theory. As a consequence, a fundamentally different expla-
nation for the current problematic state of anthropology as well as a fundamentally 
different view on evolution and development opens up. A study of religion, critical and 
scientific, must take note of these developments. 
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